“The Race Against Risk” Game Theory in Disaster Response Decision-Making
Game Theory, Disaster Management, Nash Equilibrium, Pareto Optimality, Strategic Decision Making, Cyclone Evacuation, Coordination Failure
Effective disaster management hinges on fast, coordinated decisions, particularly when disasters strike hard think cyclones tearing through coastal towns. In these moments, multiple agencies rush to respond, but having so many actors in the field often leads to strategic uncertainty. They don’t always pull in the same direction, and coordination suffers. To tackle this problem, this study turns to Game Theory, using it to dig into how disaster response agencies interact during cyclone evacuations. The research builds a straightforward two-player setup, focusing on the District Administration and Emergency Services. Each agency faces a choice: cooperate with the other or move ahead on its own. The payoff structure isn’t just academic; it weighs what actually matters—how quickly people get out, how well resources are used, how safe the public ends up. The game-theoretic analysis uncovers something revealing. There’s a Nash Equilibrium where both agencies act on their own. It’s not chaos, but it’s not ideal either—stable, but less effective than it could be. When both sides stick to their independence, response efforts lose a lot of their punch. On the other hand, if the agencies cooperate, the Pareto Optimality solution kicks in and both sides—and the affected population—come out much better. They get the greatest collective payoff, from faster evacuations to better protection of resources and lives. These findings point to a stubborn dilemma at the heart of disaster response. Agencies can end up locked in patterns that work for nobody in the long run. The research doesn’t just diagnose the problem—it calls out the urgent need for institutional mechanisms that nudge stakeholders toward true cooperation when every second counts. Ultimately, by bringing game-theoretic models into the mix, the study shines a light on more strategic, collaborative approaches that could transform the way communities prepare for and handle disasters.
Registration ID: IJVRA_702454 Published ID: IJVRA2603830
"“The Race Against Risk” Game Theory in Disaster Response Decision-Making", IJVRA - International Journal of Versatile Research and Analysis (www.IJVRA.org), ISSN:2984-8903, Vol.4, Issue 3, page no.431-434, March-2026, Available :https://ijpub.org/IJVRA/papers/IJVRA2603830.pdf
Paper Reg. ID: IJVRA_702454
Published Paper Id: IJVRA2603830
Research Area: Mathematics All
Country: -, -, India
ISSN: 2984-8903 | IMPACT FACTOR: 9.12 Calculated By Google Scholar | ESTD YEAR: 2023
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